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Why Indian Country? An Introduction to the Indian Law Landscape 
Monte Mills* 
 
I. Introduction. 
 
If you understand Indian law,1 you can understand anything. Over 500 years since their first contact 
with non-Indians and nearly 250 since America’s founding, Indian tribes and their members 
continue to build, enhance, and sustain their governments, cultures, and societies.2 In doing so, 
tribes are engaged in the diverse array of activities demanded of modern governments, from criminal 
law and child protection to environmental law, contracts, business transactions, torts, and, perhaps 
most importantly for the readers of this paper, both protection and development of a variety of 
natural resources. The range of issues facing a single Indian tribe requires familiarity with a broad 
range of substantive areas of the law, any one of which could otherwise occupy an entire legal 
career. 
 
Beyond the variety of subjects relevant to tribal law, however, understanding Indian law requires a 
deeper knowledge of the history, structure, and core of American law and government. As the 
leading treatise on Federal Indian Law notes, “Native American legislative policy and historic case 
law derives from more than five centuries of varied elements of international jurisprudence, 
constitutional principles, federal jurisdiction, conflicts of law, corporations, torts, domestic relations, 
procedure, trust law, intergovernmental immunity, and taxation.”3 Indeed, scholars steeped in the 
formation and development of Federal Indian Law raise fascinating questions about the nature of 
the United States Constitution,4 the role of racism in Supreme Court jurisprudence,5 and the 
shortcomings of legal education and the profession itself in addressing these challenging issues.6 
Felix Cohen, creator of the field of Federal Indian Law,7 famously compared the rights of Indians to 
a miner’s canary, suggesting that America’s “treatment of Indians . . . reflects the rise and fall in our 
                                                 
* This paper was originally published by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation in the  
Manual of the Special Institute on Advanced Indian Law and Natural Resources: The Basics and Beyond (2017) and 
should be cited as Monte Mills, "Why Indian Country? An Introduction to the Indian Law Landscape," 
Indian Law and Natural Resources: The Basics and Beyond 1-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2017). 
1 An important first step in understanding “Indian law” is understanding what to call it. My use of “Indian law” broadly 
includes both “Federal Indian Law,” the body of federal laws, regulations, and court decisions that define the boundaries 
of tribal, federal, and state authorities, as well as “Tribal Law,” the incredibly diverse body of laws, rules, regulations, 
policies, and court decisions of the 567 distinct federally-recognized Indian tribes within the present-day boundaries of 
the United States. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 82 Fed. Reg. 4915 (Jan. 17, 2017) (listing all 567 federally recognized Indian tribes); See also Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, Tribal Leaders Directory,https://www.bia.gov/tribalmap/DataDotGovSamples/tld_map.html (last 
visited June 13, 2017).  
2 To be consistent with the field of law, i.e., Federal Indian Law, and minimize confusion, I refer generally to tribes and 
their individual members as “Indians,” but recognize that “Native Americans,” “Indigenous,” or other more accurate 
terms may be preferable. 
3 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.01, at 6 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK]. Cohen’s Handbook is the gold standard for those seeking a deeper dive into Federal Indian Law, but there 
is also a nutshell, WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (6th ed. 2015), and a hornbook, 
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2016). 
4 E.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014). 
5 E.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005).  
6 E.g., Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 75, 91-92 (2002). 
7 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at vii.  
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democratic faith.”8 To understand Federal Indian Law is, therefore, to better understand the past, 
present, and future of the American legal system.9 
 
In an effort to help promote such understanding, this paper provides a foundation of Indian law 
principles for the deeper treatments of more nuanced topics that follow. To do so, the paper is 
divided into four sections, each taking on a core aspect of the field: history, tribal sovereignty, the 
federal-tribal relationship, and the role, meaning, and power of treaties. 
 
Importantly, while this paper surveys the basics of Indian law, the field’s diversity and complexities 
prohibit a detailed examination of every minute detail; therefore, more specific research and analysis 
would be necessary before tackling a particular legal issue. Nonetheless, by providing both basic 
principles and some broader context, readers of this work will hopefully have the conceptual 
framework within which to successfully take on such challenges. 
 
II. History. 
 
One cannot begin to understand Indian law without acknowledging history and the role it continues 
to play in shaping the body of both Federal Indian and Tribal Law. History is important on two 
levels: first, as a general matter, the weight of history and the passage of time since many of the 
events that remain relevant to the development of modern Indian law necessarily affects the field 
itself. Second, at a more discrete level, specific historical events, policy eras, and tribal events can 
drastically affect the way in which Federal Indian Law applies in a particular instance. In addition, 
for almost every tribe, the past and its lessons remain closely tied to the day-to-day decision-making 
and determinations that drive the development of Tribal Law. 
 
A. Balancing the weight of history. 
 
At the broadest level, the effect of history remains a driving force in Federal Indian Law. Professor 
Charles Wilkinson captured this effect in his recognition of Federal Indian Law as a “time-warped 
field” 10 in which “results repeatedly turn on the tension between maintaining integrity and stability 
in the law and affording the flexibility that law must maintain in order to meet the demands of 
changing circumstances.”11 While perhaps comparable in some ways to questions of constitutional 
law, this tension is particularly acute regarding questions of Indian law, which are necessarily tied to 
centuries-old tribal status and historical developments that may pre-date the United States 
constitution.12 But those historical events are often reviewed in the harsh light of a more modern 
era, where judges, legislators, and policy-makers may be unable or unwilling to recognize the role 
and importance of history.  
 
Cases involving questions regarding the present-day boundaries of Indian reservations demonstrate 
the dangers of this lack of recognition. Such cases arise as a result of Congressional acts during the 
                                                 
8 Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953). 
9 See Angela Riley, Native Nations and the Constitution: An Inquiry into ‘Extra-Constitutionality,’ 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 
173, 199 (2017) (“America is simply not America without an understanding and accommodation of the place of the 
more than five hundred Native Nations within it.”). 
10 CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 13 (1987). 
11 Id. at 23. 
12 See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381-84 (1896) (recognizing that the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation existed 
before the United States Constitution and is, therefore, not limited by the Constitution). 
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Allotment era of the late 1800s and early 1900s,13 which opened reservations to non-Indian 
settlement. A century or so later, uncertainty arises over the status of the lands in those areas that 
were opened by Congress – did Congress mean to diminish the reservation by moving its 
boundaries or does the reservation remain, albeit with non-Indians owning land within it? 
 
In developing its “fairly clean analytical structure”14 for answering such questions, the United States 
Supreme Court described precisely the tension that Professor Wilkinson captured as emblematic of 
this time-warped field. The Court begins its analysis by probing the language Congress used to open 
a reservation to non-Indian settlement, and, where such language expresses a Congressional decision 
to terminate or where such a decision is “clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative 
history” the Court can safely rely on such Congressional direction.15 But where such clear, express 
evidence is lacking, the Court can also see how history played out on those lands: “Where non-
Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and the area has long since lost its 
Indian character, we have acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have 
occurred.”16 In some cases, these “changing circumstances” can drive the Court’s review of the 
original Congressional act, which potentially undermines the “integrity and stability in the law.”17  
Most recently, the Court downplayed subsequent demographics and “justifiable expectations” to 
confirm the boundaries of a challenged reservation based on Congressional language.18 Even then, 
however, the Court suggested that the passage of time could be relevant to related questions 
regarding the tribe’s authority over the disputed lands.19 Thus, the passage of time and the 
movement of history – separate and apart from specific relevant historical facts – can influence the 
development of Indian law and, to be effective, practitioners must recognize the role of history and 
its weight upon the field.  
 
B. Understanding the history of Federal Indian law. 
 
Beyond recognizing the weight of history and its effect on the field, successful Indian law 
practitioners must also understand particular aspects of the field’s history and the ways in which that 
history shaped the contours of present-day doctrine. While the unique histories, traditions, legal 
structures, and other aspects of each individual Indian tribe make generalizing from the broader 
history of Federal Indian Law and policy treacherous,20 one must understand the history of federal 
                                                 
13 See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. 
14 Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). 
15 Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973). 
16 Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 (citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604-05 (1977) (non-Indian settlement of 
and state jurisdiction over an area “not only demonstrates the parties’ understanding of the meaning of the Act, but has 
created justifiable expectations which should not be upset” by other interpretations of that prior Congressional act.)). 
17 WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 23; see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 604-05; Solem, 465 U.S. at 472, n.13 (“Resort to 
subsequent demographic history is, of course, an unorthodox and potentially unreliable method of statutory 
interpretation. However, in the area of surplus land acts, where various factors kept Congress from focusing on the 
diminishment issue, the technique is a necessary expedient.”) (citation omitted).  
18 Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.Ct. 1072, 1082 (2016). 
19 Id. (“[W]e express no view about whether equitable considerations of laches and acquiescence may curtail the Tribe's 
power to tax the retailers of Pender in light of the Tribe's century-long absence from the disputed lands.”) See also 
Wyoming v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 849 F.3d 861, 880 (10th Cir. 2017) (recent decision regarding reservation 
diminishment, in which the court briefly considered subsequent demographics).  
20 See, e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 7-8 (describing these differences, among other issues, as “scattering forces” and 
“barriers to a unitary doctrine” within the field); Phillip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 434-36 (2005) (describing the incoherence of Indian law, and the uneasiness it causes for some 
Supreme Court Justices). 
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policies toward Indian tribes in order to grasp the complexities of each individual challenge facing 
the field in the present day. Although it is impossible to organize over 250 years of history into neat 
and discrete categories, 21 the following presents a brief overview of the general eras of Federal 
Indian Law and policy.  
 
1. Laying the Foundations (Pre-Colonial times–Early 1830s).22 
 
The roots of European colonial presence in America are interlaced with tribal relations and the 
rights of North America’s indigenous peoples to the lands of the “New World.”23 Because European 
colonizers imported their own legal traditions that were subsequently incorporated into American 
legal doctrine, the foundations of Federal Indian Law can be traced all the way back to the medieval 
crusades, through Papal doctrines, Spanish conquest, and British Imperial policies up until the 
Revolutionary War and the founding of America.24 Importantly, though Federal Indian Law set its 
own course in an attempt to find a “new and better rule, better adapted to the actual state of things” 
in the so-called New World,25 the fundamental conflicts imbedded deep within these European legal 
concepts set forth challenges for the field that remain to this day.  
 
First, the colonial approach to dealing with the tribes of North America largely imported the practice 
of treaty-making, an approach that necessarily “implied recognition of tribes as self-governing 
peoples.”26 Though each treaty could vary depending upon the terms negotiated by and between the 
colonial and tribal representatives, those agreements served to define the geographical, military, and 
trade boundaries between the two sovereign entities, to the exclusion of other colonial powers.27 
These agreements also allowed for the purchase and settlement of indigenous lands by European 
colonists with the consent of the Indians and also provided the tribes an opportunity to protect and 
reserve important rights.28  
 
Contrarily, however, European colonists also imported the notion of conquest and its accordant 
legal rights, including the idea that conquest of inferior indigenous peoples grants the conqueror 
superior rights of title and ownership.29 This colonialist and racist notion underpinned and 
promoted the conception of Indians as savage or “Wild Beasts of the Forest” who would “retire” to 
the wilderness as European or American settlers advanced and purchased their territories from 
them.30  
 
                                                 
21 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 1.02, at 8. (“[D]espite the appealing tidiness of this [chronological] analysis, 
there never has been a single, clearly articulated American Indian policy at any given time.”) For a far more detailed 
description of these eras, see id. §§ 1.02-.07, at 8-108. See also, FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 1.3, at 7-15; CANBY, supra note 3, 
at 12-34. 
22 Given the breadth and complexity of Federal Indian Law and policy, it does not fit neatly into specific timeframes, so 
these years are rough estimates.  
23 See DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER & KRISTEN 
A. CARPENTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47 (West Academic 7th ed. 2017).  
24 See id. at 47-71. 
25 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 591 (1823). 
26 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 23, at 85. 
27 Id.  
28 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK supra note 3, § 1.02, at 12-14. 
29 See, e.g., Johnson, 21 U.S. at 571-81 (describing the theory and history of European conquest in America). 
30 Letter from George Washington, Commander-in-Chief, to James Duane, Head of the Committee of Indian Aff. of the 
Continental Congress, (Sept. 7, 1783), reprinted in GETCHES, ET AL. supra note 22, at 99-100. 
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The conflict between the sovereign status of tribes through treaties and the superior rights of 
European “conquerors” dictated by their own legal tradition muddied the status of land claims and 
property rights across the original colonies and, later, the new United States. Similarly, the 
inconsistency between entering treaties to guarantee a sovereign-to-sovereign relationship in 
perpetuity and the idea that Indians, as a savage and inferior people, would ultimately disappear 
before the advancement of non-Indian settlers also played a significant role in shaping both Federal 
Indian Law and policy as well as the United States Constitution.31  
 
A second conflict, related to but distinct from the question of tribal status and land ownership, 
revolved around who had authority to deal with tribal relations and Indian affairs. While the 
sovereign-to-sovereign nature of treaty-making suggested a primary role for centralized government, 
the practicalities of colonial rule presented significant challenges. For example, the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, which sought to exert King George III’s authority to prevent land speculation 
by the British colonists with tribes on the western frontier, largely motivated the colonial resistance 
to ongoing British authority.32  
 
The Continental Congress also struggled with the “divided legacy” on Indian affairs left by British 
imperial rule.33 The division arose over the authority of individual colonies to enter into treaties and 
other arrangements with local tribes and the desire of British officials to ensure a more coordinated 
and consolidated approach to tribal relations.34 Unable to clearly resolve that divide, the Articles of 
Confederation instead ended up reserving to Congress the “sole and exclusive right and power” over 
Indian affairs but only so long as such power did not infringe or violate “the legislative right of any 
State within its own limits.”35 Thereafter, representatives of the Continental Congress negotiated 
treaties with tribes across the new nation, including the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee 
Nation, which guaranteed peace to the Cherokee and protection by the United States.36 But many 
states, including the State of Georgia in which the Cherokee resided, rejected this perceived 
Congressional interference in what the states viewed as local matters and issues of state authority.37  
 
These conflicts, rooted in Indian affairs, posed existential threats to the young republic and largely 
drove the framing of the U.S. Constitution, which, according to one leading scholar, was ratified by 
Georgia on the belief that, as an implicit reward for ratification, the federal government would 
provide military support to “eradicate the Indian threat.”38 Thus, while the Constitution only 
expressly reserved to the Congress the exclusive authority to regulate “commerce … with the 
Indians” and confirmed the supremacy of treaties made by and between the United States and the 
tribes, the underlying conflict between federal and state authority over Indian affairs continued to 
bubble.39 
 
                                                 
31 See generally, Ablavsky supra note 4 (describing the conflicts to Constitutionl ratification posed by Georgia and other 
states, who demanded federal assistance to remove tribes from within their boundaries).  
32 GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 22, at 67-69. 
33 Ablavsky supra note 4, at 1011. 
34 Id.  
35 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4. 
36 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 1.02[3], at 20-21; Treaty with the Cherokees, 1785, pmbl., 7 Stat. 18. 
37 See, e.g., Ablavsky supra note 4, at 1029-30 (describing Georgia’s reaction to the treaty negotiations at Hopewell). 
38 Id. at 1072. 
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
6 
 
The resolution of these fundamental conflicts, between tribes as sovereigns and European legal 
doctrines of conquest and discovery and between the federal and state governments over the role 
and place of Indian tribes in the federal system, began in earnest with the Supreme Court’s 1823 
decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh.40 That decision, the first of the so-called Marshall Trilogy that form 
the basis of Federal Indian Law,41 defined the property rights of tribes in light of the colonial 
doctrines of discovery and conquest, ultimately determining that though the tribes retained the right 
of possession and use of the land, the United States, as successors in interest to Britain’s colonial 
rule and by virtue of the European legal doctrines described above, acquired the “absolute ultimate 
title …, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the 
exclusive right of acquiring.”42 The Johnson decision cemented the doctrine of discovery into the 
foundations of Indian law and hinted at the forthcoming decisions regarding the status of tribes vis-
à-vis the constitution, federal, and state governments. 
 
Those subsequent decisions, issued in 1831 and 1832, stemmed from the ongoing conflict between 
Georgia and the federal government over the presence of the Cherokee Nation within the 
boundaries of the State of Georgia. Unable to overcome the federal government’s treaties with the 
Cherokee, Georgia simply ignored the rights and protections guaranteed therein and sought to take 
over Cherokee territory.43 In answering the question of whether the Supreme Court could exercise 
jurisdiction over the original action brought by the Cherokee Nation to stop Georgia’s efforts, Chief 
Justice Marshall defined the Cherokee Nation as a “domestic, dependent nation,”44 a description of 
tribal status that remains relevant to present.45 Marshall also noted that, by virtue of the language of 
treaties like the Treaty of Hopewell, the Cherokee were under the protection of the United States 
and were therefore “in a state pupilage” and like a “ward to [the United States as] guardian.”46 While 
rooted in treaty language of protection, Marshall’s conception of tribes also carried the specter of 
inferiority and savagery inherent in the “Savage as the Wolf” approach of early federal policy.47 
Notwithstanding its colonial roots, however, the conception of tribes as wards to the federal 
guardian formed the basis of the federal governments trust relationship with and responsibility to 
Indian tribes ever since Marshall’s opinion.48 
 
In the term immediately following the Cherokee Nation decision, the Court again considered the 
Nation’s conflict with the State of Georgia, this time getting to the merits of whether Georgia could 
apply its laws within Cherokee territory. In Worcester v. Georgia,49 Chief Justice Marshall again relied 
upon the treaties by and between the federal government and the Cherokee Nation to determine 
that the “whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is by our constitution and 
laws, vested in the government of the United States.”50 Thus, Georgia law could have no effect 
                                                 
40 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
41 See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  
42 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592. 
43 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11. 
44 Id. at 13. 
45 See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) (citations omitted) (“Indian tribes are 
‘domestic dependent nations.’”). 
46 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 13. 
47 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
48 See, e.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 192 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
49 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
50 31 U.S. at 561. 
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within the Cherokee’s territory because it would interfere with the terms of those treaties, which 
were recognized by the constitution as the supreme law of the land.51  
 
Marshall’s insulation of the Cherokee Nation from the reach of Georgia’s authority protected the 
tribe’s “distinct community,”52 preserved the sanctity of treaties between tribes and the federal 
government, and, along with his prior decisions in Johnson and Cherokee Nation, set the course for 
Federal Indian Law to develop. These decisions announced the fundamental tenets of the field – 
tribal sovereignty, the federal-tribal trust relationship, and the importance of treaties. But, while this 
first era of Federal Indian Law had important ramifications for the future of the doctrine, it did not 
prevent the federal government from drastically shifting its approach to Indian policy over the 
succeeding two centuries. 
 
2. Removal & Reservations (1830s-1870s). 
 
It is rumored that President Andrew Jackson, a staunch supporter of Georgia during its conflicts 
with the Cherokee Nation, said of Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in Worcester, “John Marshall has 
made his decision; now let him enforce it.”53 Notwithstanding the victory for Cherokee interests in 
that decision and the Court’s reliance on treaty guarantees of protection by the federal government, 
the federal government soon focused its efforts on removing tribes from their territories, particularly 
those east of the Mississippi River. In 1830, for example, Congress, with the urging of President 
Jackson, passed the Indian Removal Act, authorizing the President to negotiate new treaties 
demanding the cession of then-existing Indian lands in exchange for lands west of the Mississippi, to 
which the Indians would relocate.54 Relying on this authority, the United States pressed tribes to 
renegotiate their earlier treaties and, though many opposed both removal and renegotiation of those 
sacred texts, a “combination[ ] of resignation, military coercion, and fraud” resulted in the federal 
government securing agreement from at least factions of a number of tribes to remove westward.55 
When many tribal members, like the Cherokee, remained on their lands, the United States military 
then forcibly removed them.56 Though some eastern tribes clung tenaciously to their lands and 
remain on their homelands east of the Mississippi,57 the federal government largely succeeded in 
carrying out George Washington’s half-century-old prescription for acquiring additional territory for 
non-Indian settlement.58 
 
As non-Indian settlement proceeded westward, tribes and their territories continued to be invaded 
and inundated by squatters, prospectors, military expeditions, and others in search of Manifest 
Destiny. Like the colonial era approach, the federal government sought treaties with tribes across the 
West in an attempt to limit conflicts and contain tribal communities within particular areas.59 But 
                                                 
51 Id. at 559-60. 
52 Id. at 561. 
53 See GETCHES, ET AL. supra note 23, at 147 (citation omitted).  
54 An Act to provide for an exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any of the states or territories, and for their 
removal west of the river Mississippi, 4 Stat. 411, 412 (May 28, 1830). 
55 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 1.03[4][a], at 50. 
56 See generally GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS 
(1932); JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION (1988). 
57 See, e.g., GETCHES, ET AL. supra note 23, at 153 (noting the continuing presence of the Seminole in southern Florida, 
the North Carolina Cherokee, and the Choctaw of Mississippi). 
58 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
59 See, e.g., Treaty of Fort Laramie, 1851, 11 Stat. 749 (including promises of peace and establishing territories for various 
tribes); Treaty with the Blackfeet, 1855, 11 Stat. 657 (promising “perpetual” peace between the United States and the 
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conflicts, particularly with the ever-expanding on-rush of non-Indian settlers, remained. As the tide 
of non-Indians continued to roll over tribal lands, the federal government demanded tribal 
concessions in subsequent treaties, many of which resulted in smaller and smaller tribal 
reservations.60  
 
Thus, by 1871, when Congress forbade additional treaty-making,61 many tribes had already entered 
into a series of treaties, each of which represented a separate basis for a sovereign-to-sovereign 
relationship with the federal government. Through the Removal and Reservation period, these terms 
became less and less favorable, and resulted in the removal of many tribes from their ancestral 
homelands and the significant reduction of traditional tribal territories. While the end of treaty-
making in 1871 did not significantly change the way in which the federal government made 
agreements with tribes or set aside tribal reservations,62 the next era of federal Indian policy would 
have significant and lasting impact on tribes and tribal lands. 
 
3. Allotment and Assimilation (1870s-1930s). 
 
Spurred by the end of the Civil War, technological advances, and military prowess, the federal 
government magnified its westward focus through the last half of the 19th Century.63 When 
combined with the lingering notion of Indian “savagery” and inferiority, the lack of any additional 
lands on which to remove Indians from the “progress” of non-Indians, and a more comprehensive 
approach to making Indian policy, this American hubris resulted in a broad, multi-faceted, and 
aggressive assault on Indian lands, cultures, and survival.64 Cloaked in efforts to “civilize” Indians, 
the federal government allotted reservation lands,65 supported the removal of Indian children to 
boarding schools, and prohibited cultural and spiritual practices while promoting conversion to 
Christianity.66 While the assimilative onslaught against Indianness was extensive and its effects long-
lasting, the allotment of Indian lands constituted perhaps the single-most drastic and reverberating 
impact on tribes and tribal communities.67  
 
                                                 
Blackfeet Tribe, including a covenant to be peaceful with other tribes, and setting aside a territory on which the 
Blackfeet could reside). 
60 See, e.g., Treaty with the Sioux, 1868, 15 Stat. 635 (reducing the territory reserved by the Great Sioux Nation in the 
1851 Treaty and requiring that the Nation relinquish the “right to occupy permanently the territory outside their [new] 
reservation,” although the Nation also reserved hunting rights in certain off-reservation lands as well as some “unceded 
Indian territory” elsewhere). 
61 Act of March 3, 1871, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566. 
62 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 1.03[9] at 70-71 (explaining that, after 1871, agreements with tribes were still 
negotiated but then approved by both the House and Senate and additional lands were reserved by Executive Order of 
the President, which had been used since 1855). 
63 See, e.g., id. § 1.04, at 71 (“Powered by more than the technological marvels such as the railroads, the steam engine, and 
the mechanical harvester, the new expansionist policy was also propelled by the ‘go-getter’ spirit that infused the nation 
after the war.”). 
64 See, e.g., id. (“There was no place left to remove the Indian, and there was little sympathy for the preservation of a way 
of life that left farmlands unturned, coal unmined, and timber uncut.”) 
65 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (the “General Allotment Act” or the “Dawes Act). 
66 See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-
Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 776-805 (1997). 
67 See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (analyzing in detail the effects of 
allotment on Indian law). 
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The allotment policy was carried out through a variety of enactments over many years, but the 1887 
General Allotment Act (or the Dawes Act) entrenched allotment as an official federal policy.68 The 
Act did not effectuate any specific allotments but, instead, authorized Congress or the President to 
survey particular reservations and then allot portions of 80 acres, for agricultural purposes, or 160 
acres, for grazing purposes, to individual Indians.69 By the terms of the General Allotment Act, these 
allotments were to be held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of those Indians for 25 
years following their issuance, during which time the allotments would be free from state or county 
taxation.70 Upon the conclusion of that 25-year period, the General Allotment Act authorized the 
issuance of a fee patent to the individual Indian, who would also then be a United States citizen 
(along with any other Indians who moved away from their tribe and “adopted the habits of civilized 
life.”)71 Congress later amended the Act to allow the Secretary of Interior to determine whether an 
allottee is “competent and capable of managing his or her affairs,” at which time the Secretary could, 
regardless of the 25-year trust period, end the allotment and “cause to be issued to such allottee a 
patent in fee simple.”72 Once allotments passed to fee-simple ownership, any number of devices and 
schemes, including imposition of local taxes and foreclosure, fraudulent purchases, or outright theft, 
were then employed to strip the Indian owner of rightful title.73  
 
In addition to the loss of land through allotment and the subsequent loss of fee title, the General 
Allotment Act also authorized the purchase of so-called “surplus lands” – the unallotted reservation 
land left over after allotments were parceled out to individual Indians – by the Secretary of the 
Interior.74 These “purchases” were conducted pursuant to Congressional acts allotting individual 
reservations, opening the surplus lands to homesteading by non-Indian settlers, and providing for, at 
least in theory, the collection of proceeds from sales to such homesteaders by the Secretary of the 
Interior for the benefit of the tribe.75 The settlement of non-Indian homesteaders on such surplus 
lands, in addition to the loss of allotted lands to non-Indians, resulted in a checkerboard pattern of 
land ownership within the boundaries of allotted reservations, creating significantly more complicated 
questions of ownership and tribal authority.76 Ultimately, the toll of allotment on tribal land 
ownership was severe, with over 90 million acres – one-third of the total tribal land base – passing 
out of tribal hands from 1887 until 1934.77 
 
                                                 
68 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388. 
69 25 U.S.C. § 331, repealed by the Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-462, § 106(a)(1), 
114 Stat. 2007. 
70 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, §§ 5, 6, 24 Stat. 389-90, (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348, 349 (2012)). While the General 
Allotment Act prescribed these general terms, reservation-specific allotment acts authorized by the General Allotment 
Act could vary from reservation to reservation. See, e.g., Act of May 30, 1908, Pub. L. No. 177, 35 Stat. 558 (providing for 
the survey and allotment of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation of up to 320 acres of grazing land and up to 20 acres of 
timber lands in addition to 40 acres of irrigable lands, if available). 
71 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, at § 5.  
72 Act of May 8, 1906, Pub. L. No. 49-149, 34 Stat. 183. 
73 FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 1.3, at 10. 
74 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, at § 5.  
75 See, e.g., Act of May 30, 1908, supra note 70, at §§ 4-9, 15. 
76 In addition to checkerboard surface ownership, the withdrawal of some sub-surface mineral estates from 
homesteading further complicated ownership, creating a three-dimensional checkerboard of surface and sub-surface 
ownership. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 867-72 (1999) (describing the history and 
effect of the federal reservation of coal from homesteaders in the 1909 and 1910 Coal Lands Acts on the Tribe’s 
ownership of aspects of the subsurface estate). 
77 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 1.04, at 74. 
10 
 
Beyond federal policies aimed at diminishing tribal status and dispersing tribal lands, the extension 
of the federal government’s legal authority over tribes also reached a peak during the allotment era. 
Though Chief Justice Marshall’s trilogy of decisions in the early 1800s established the exclusivity of 
federal authority over tribal relations and the supremacy of federal authority,78 Supreme Court 
decisions of the allotment era broadly interpreted federal authority in a new way. When the federal 
government allotted the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache reservation, for example, it failed to secure 
consent from two-thirds of the adult males of the reservation as was required by a prior treaty.79 
Upon a challenge from a tribal leader urging the Supreme Court to uphold the promises of the 
earlier treaty, the Court refused, holding that “it was never doubted that the power to abrogate 
existed in Congress, and that, in a contingency, such power might be availed of from considerations 
of governmental policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians.”80 
Rather than consider the tribal allegations of fraud and coercion related to efforts to secure the 
requisite consent for allotment, the Court instead presumed that congress had acted in good faith 
and termed the allotment of the reservation “a mere change in the form of Indian tribal property.”81 
To support its endorsement of federal plenary power over Indian affairs, the Court expanded upon 
Marshall’s original concept of tribes as “wards” to the federal government to imply tribal 
dependence and incompetence, which necessitated the overriding federal authority to protect 
them.82 By reifying and reinforcing plenary federal authority, the Court wrote Congress a blank 
check to expand policies designed to break up tribal lands and existence, even where such efforts ran 
contrary to treaty promises or tribal interests. The shadow of these legal and policy initiatives still 
lingers over present-day Indian Country.83  
 
4. Reorganization (1934-1950s). 
 
The drastic effects of the allotment era eventually prompted reconsideration of the federal 
government’s approach to Indian policy. Far from “civilizing” tribes and promoting economic 
progress, federal efforts to assimilate Indians failed miserably, leaving most reservations far worse 
off. Recognizing that conditions in Indian Country were not improving in the late 1920s, the 
Secretary of the Interior commissioned a study of the social and economic conditions of American 
Indians. The result, which came to be known as the Meriam Report because of its author, Lewis 
Meriam, was issued in 1928 and opened with a blunt statement of its findings: “[A]n overwhelming 
majority of the Indians are poor, even extremely poor, and they are not adjusted to the economic 
                                                 
78 See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text. 
79 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 563-64 (1903). 
80 Id. at 566. 
81 Id. at 568. 
82 See id. (recognizing Congress’ “full administrative power … over tribal property … the property of those who … were 
in substantial effect, wards of the government.”); see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886) 
(upholding Congress’ extension of federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country because Congress’ “power … over 
these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as 
to the safety of those among whom they dwell [and such power] must exist in th[e federal] Government, because it 
never has existed anywhere else; because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States; 
because it has never been denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”).  
83 Like Federal Indian Law, Indian Country is a term of art developed through case law and subsequently adopted by 
Congress to include “(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, 
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or 
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, 
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.” 18 U.S.C. § 
1151 (2012). 
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and social system of the dominant white civilization.”84 The confirmation of the allotment era’s 
failures combined with the broader momentum of the New Deal promised a shift in federal Indian 
policy. 
 
In an effort to move federal Indian policy away from the failures of allotment, promote tribal self-
determination and economic development, and thereby reduce the federal role in Indian Country, 
Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934.85 The IRA dramatically swung the 
pendulum of federal Indian policy away from the destruction of tribal cultures and governance and, 
instead, authorized the organization of tribal governments through the adoption of constitutions86 
and the creation of corporations through which tribes could engage in business ventures.87 In a 
direct rebuke to the prior era of federal policy, the IRA also explicitly ended the allotment of tribal 
land88 and, in language that has since become the source of repeated litigation in the modern era of 
tribal gaming, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to purchase and place into trust additional 
lands for the benefit of tribes.89 By reversing the attack on tribal governments and land bases, the 
IRA laid “the foundation for a resurrection of tribal government and power,” but was not a total 
panacea for reinvigorating tribal sovereignty.90 
 
While some tribes took advantage of the authority offered by the IRA to adopt constitutions and 
reshape their often dormant tribal government, other tribes refused, viewing the IRA as offering a 
restrictive and foreign way of managing tribal affairs.91 The Act itself offered little additional 
authority to tribes beyond the inherent sovereign rights they had always enjoyed and as confirmed 
by Justice Marshall’s early trilogy of cases.92 In addition, the federal presence on many reservations 
and within the text of the boiler-plate constitutions offered to tribes by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
remained extensive, resulting in significant limitations on independent tribal authority.93 Thus, 
although the IRA “remains the foundational federal legislation in modern Indian affairs,”94 its 
promises of renewed exercise of tribal sovereignty and economic prosperity remained elusive for 
many tribes. In fact, some have argued that, despite its support for tribal governments and self-
determination, the IRA was still an effort to promote assimilation of Indians by providing a longer 
transition phase for tribes to become independent from the federal trust relationship.95 It was not 
long until the federal government once again sought to rapidly accelerate such assimilation. 
                                                 
84 The Problem of Indian Administration, Inst. for Govt. Research (Feb. 21, 1928), 
http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/meriam.html.  
85 Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq. 
86 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2012). 
87 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2012). 
88 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2012). 
89 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012); see also Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (limiting Secretary’s authority to take lands into 
trust under § 465 to tribes that were “under federal jurisdiction” when the IRA was passed in 1934); Confederated 
Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Oregon v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting challenge to Secretary’s trust 
land acquisition on the basis of the Secretary’s interpretation of the terms “recognized” and “under federal jurisdiction” 
in § 465), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1433 (2017). 
90 VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE, 101 (1983). 
91 See, e.g., GETCHES, ET AL. supra note 23, at 225-26 (describing challenges by traditional Hopi tribal members to the 
Tribe’s IRA government). 
92 WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 68. 
93 See DELORIA, JR. & LYTLE, supra note 90, at 102 (“Secretarial approval of constitutions, by-laws, selection of legal 
counsel, and most tribal resolutions proposing land use and civil and criminal codes was in effect a veto power on the 
activities of the new formed tribal governments.”) 
94 FLETCHER, supra note 3 § 1.3, at 12. 
95 Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. IND. L. REV. 139, 144 (1977). 
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5. Termination (1950s-1960s). 
 
The federal government of the late 1940s and early 1950s still struggled with its approach to Indian 
policy, particularly in light of the acknowledged failure of allotment and the incremental progress of 
tribal government following the IRA. Whipped up in part by the anti-Communist fervor of the time, 
a new policy focused on ending the federal-tribal relationship and detribalizing Indian Country 
became the focus of federal Indian policy during this time period. 
 
The centerpiece of the termination era was House Concurrent Resolution 108, which called for 
certain tribes as well as all tribes within certain states to “be freed from Federal supervision and 
control and from all disabilities and limitation specially applicable to Indians.”96 Efforts to do so 
took the form of tribal-specific termination acts, taking effect from 1961 to 1966, that authorized 
the development of termination plans to end the federal-tribal relationship, remove the trust status 
of tribal lands, and, for purposes of the federal government, essentially end the tribe’s existence as 
an Indian tribe.97 The result was the termination of “approximately 109 tribes and bands,” affecting 
three percent of all federally recognized Indians and reducing the total land base of tribal trust lands 
“by about 3.2 per cent.”98 
 
Beyond explicit termination of certain tribes and tribes within particular states, Congress also 
transferred aspects of federal jurisdiction over certain reservations to states. Congress passed Public 
Law 83-280 in 1953, which mandated that certain states assume jurisdiction over Indian Country and 
authorized similar assumptions by additional states.99 Although the Supreme Court later determined 
that Congress did not authorize states to exercise general civil regulatory authority,100 the effect was 
to broaden state control over reservation affairs, replacing the federal trust relationship with what 
the Supreme Court had termed the tribes’ “deadliest enemy.”101  
 
In conjunction with the termination acts and Public Law 280, the federal government drew back 
from tribes on many other fronts during this time period, including education, healthcare, and land 
management.102 The federal government also promoted the relocation of Indians from reservations 
to urban centers by expanding assistance programs for moving and employment in those often far-
from-home cities.103 Like the allotment and assimilation era only a generations prior, the termination 
era represented another full-frontal federal assault on tribes and tribalism, which resulted in drastic 
changes for those tribes who were terminated or who remained in Public Law 280 states but even 
demanded that tribes not directly under threat of termination actively fight it off. From that fight 
grew tribal efforts to once again redefine federal Indian policy; efforts that resulted in the modern 
era of tribal sovereignty and self-determination.104 
                                                 
96 H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (Aug. 1, 1953).  
97 Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 95, at 151-52. 
98 Id. at 151. 
99 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, 588-89 (1953).  
100 Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976). 
101 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
102 See Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 95, at 160-62. 
103 Id. at 161-62. 
104 See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE, 86 (2005) (“For as the shock waves of termination rolled 
through Indian country, Indian people realized that something had to be done and that they could count upon nobody 
[but] themselves. That realization became a major impetus for the gathering of the modern tribal sovereignty 
movement.”). 
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6. Self-Determination (1970s-Present). 
 
Though the 1970 statement of President Nixon on recommendations for Indian Policy marked the 
true birth of the self-determination era, the seeds of that era, and many of the recommendations 
described by President Nixon, were planted by President Johnson’s earlier statements and 
establishment of the National Council on Indian Opportunity.105 Reacting to the continued failure of 
federal Indian policy, particularly during the termination era, both Presidents Johnson and Nixon 
proposed once again redefining the federal-tribal relationship but suggested that promoting tribal 
interests and tribal authority would be the better approach.106 This shift in federal policy set the stage 
for a slew of initiatives aimed at promoting tribal sovereignty and self-determination. 
 
Of the many federal laws focused on tribal interests passed since the self-determination era began in 
1970, perhaps none have had as great an effect as the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act of 1975, or ISDEAA.107 In furtherance of the federal policy of tribal self-
determination, the ISDEAA directed the Secretary of the Interior to enter into contracts with Indian 
tribes to “plan, conduct, and administer” previously federal programs for the benefit of the tribe’s 
members and community.108 By doing so, Congress sought to “assur[e] maximum Indian 
participation in the direction of … Federal services to Indian communities so as to render such 
services more responsive to the needs and desires of those communities.”109 Though a number of 
factors impeded a universally successful implementation of such maximum participation and 
required numerous subsequent amendments to address,110 the success of the ISDEAA in 
transferring federal funds, administrative and institutional support is undeniable.111 By giving tribes 
the option to contract and assume responsibility for federal services, including law enforcement, 
tribal courts, natural resource management, healthcare, and social services, among others, the 
ISDEAA allows tribes to decide how best to carry out those functions. Beyond the obvious benefits 
to tribal members and local citizens, the effect has also been the continued building and expansion 
of tribal institutional and governmental capacity. 
 
A number of other federal legislative initiatives, most driven by tribal leaders, have broadened the 
platform on which tribes can continue such efforts.112 These laws include efforts to address the 
effects of the termination era by restoring terminated tribes and recognizing their land bases, 
                                                 
105 See FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 1.3, at 13. 
106 See, e.g., The Forgotten American, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Message to the Congress on Goals and Programs 
for the American Indian, 4 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 438, 440 (Mar. 6, 1968) (“I propose, in short, a policy of 
maximum choice for the American Indian: a policy expressed in programs of self-help, self-development, self-
determination.”); Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 1970); 116 CONG. REC. 23,258 (“Federal termination errs in one 
direction, Federal paternalism errs in the other. Only by clearly rejected both of these extremes can we achieve a policy 
which truly serves the best interests of the Indian people. Self-determination among the Indian people can and must be 
encouraged without the threat of eventual termination.”). 
107 Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (Jan. 4, 1975). 
108 Id. § 102.  
109 Id. § 3(a). 
110 See Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-Governance under the Indian 
Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. IND. L. REV. 1, 18-48 (2015). 
111 See id. at 48-49 (detailing the growth of tribal ISDEAA self-governance programs). 
112 See Wilkinson, supra note 104, at 261-65 (documenting the range of tribally-oriented federal laws enacted in the 
modern era). 
14 
 
protecting Indian children from removal in placement proceedings, promoting tribal control of 
natural resources development and environmental regulation, and ensuring greater protection for 
Indian religious practices, ancestral human remains and associated funerary objects.113 Though real 
challenges to the ongoing evolution of the federal self-determination policy remain,114 tribes have 
reshaped federal Indian policy in the modern era to more clearly and accurately reflect tribal 
priorities and interests.  
 
Having persisted and survived through the history of divergent federal Indian policies, tribes 
continue to exercise their inherent sovereign authority, engage and relate with the federal 
government, and rely upon the rights they reserved centuries ago in treaties. While the history of 
federal Indian policy provides a broader context for understanding the development and current 
state of these three issues, they remain fundamental tenets of Federal Indian Law that define the 
legal status and authority of tribes. The remainder of this paper covers the essential legal aspects of 
tribal sovereignty, the federal-tribal relationship, and the ongoing vitality of treaties, with a particular 
focus on how those issues relate to natural resources issues. 
  
III. Tribal Sovereignty. 
 
Indian tribes have exercised sovereign rights of governance and authority since time immemorial. 
Indeed, well before the founding of the United States, “the British Crown and several of its colonies 
dealt with the Indian tribes as wholly independent foreign nations.”115 The nature of these dealings 
as sovereign-to-sovereign is reflected in the treaties made between those colonial powers and the 
tribes and the nature of tribal sovereignty was subsequently recognized and described by Chief 
Justice Marshall.116 Importantly, however, Marshall also recognized limitations on tribal sovereign 
authority presented by “the actual state of things” – namely that “discovery gave an exclusive right 
to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right 
to such a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.”117 
Similarly, Marshall’s view of the “discovery” of an inhabited continent by European colonists also 
restricted tribal sovereign authority to engage in foreign relations independent from the United 
States.118 Nonetheless, subject to an important caveat based on more recent Supreme Court 
decisions described in greater detail below, the Court has more recently recognized “that the Indian 
tribes have not given up their full sovereignty…tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not 
withdrawn by treaty or statute.”119 
 
The pre-constitutional and inherent nature of tribal sovereignty has important implications for both 
Federal Indian Law and the exercise of tribal authority to Tribal Law. As Charles Wilkinson notes, 
“Tribal sovereignty forms the bedrock of the modern court decisions and statutes.”120 Tribal 
                                                 
113 See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 23, at 252-56 (cataloguing these and other federal laws). 
114 Strommer & Osborne, supra note 110, at 49-66. 
115 William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987). 
116 See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text. 
117 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823). 
118 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1833) (“The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, 
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from 
time immemorial; with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse 
with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a 
restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians.”) 
119 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
120 Wilkinson, supra note 104, at 248. 
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sovereignty played a central role, for example, in the Supreme Court’s consideration of the scope of 
tribal authority to tax on-reservation transactions,121 including the severance of oil and gas from 
tribal trust lands.122 Lower courts have also considered the extent to which federal laws regulating 
labor and employment relationships impede upon tribal sovereign authority to determine whether 
such federal standards may restrict tribal labor practices, such as through tribal employment rights 
ordinances.123 Thus, the extent to which tribes continue to retain and exercise the right to “make 
their own laws and be ruled by them,”124 the true scope of tribal sovereignty, remains relevant to 
virtually the entire range of tribal activities. 
 
Importantly, however, in recent decades, the Supreme Court has taken a much narrower view of the 
extent of tribal sovereignty, particularly as it relates to tribal authority over non-Indians. The Court, 
by recognizing what has come to be known as implicit divestiture, has interpreted new limitations 
upon tribal sovereign authority by determining that the exercise of such authority has been 
withdrawn “by implication as a necessary result of the[ tribe’s] dependent status.”125 This implicit 
divestiture of tribal sovereignty, though inconsistent with the traditional notion that only Congress 
can act to strip tribes of authority and, even then, only explicitly,126 has resulted in decisions 
stripping tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians127 and substantially limiting the scope of 
tribal civil authority over non-tribal members on non-tribal lands within reservation boundaries.128 
The implicit nature of these determinations replaces the certainty of demanding a clear statement 
from Congress in order to diminish tribal authority with subjective judicial determinations of tribal 
status relative to the facts of a particular case.129 These decisions have clouded the boundaries of 
tribal sovereign authority as it relates to tribal civil, criminal, and regulatory jurisdiction over non-
members.130 
 
Outside the walls of the Supreme Court, however, both Congress and the Executive Branch have 
engaged in numerous efforts to protect, restore, and enhance tribal sovereign authority. In response 
to the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Duro v. Reina,131 for example, in which the Court 
determined that, like with non-Indians, tribal sovereignty did not include criminal jurisdiction over 
non-tribal member Indians, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to expressly recognize 
inherent tribal authority over such Indians.132 The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
122 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (“The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian 
sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management.”). 
123 See, e.g., Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd, 791 F.3d. 648, 661-70 (6th Cir. 2015); Nat’l Labor Rel. 
Bd. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d 1278, (10th Cir. 2000).  
124 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
125 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
126 See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2031-32 (2014); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49, 60 (1978). 
127 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
128 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1980) (“[E]xercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes, and so cannot 
survive without express Congressional delegation.”) 
129 See, e.g., David Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. 
REV. 1573, 1620 (1996) (arguing that these and other Supreme Court decisions since the early 1980s are a new era of 
judicial subjectivism, marked in part by the Court “assum[ing] the prerogative of balancing various non-Indian interests 
in order to prune tribal sovereignty to the Court’s own notion of what it ought to look like.”) 
130  See e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 8.3, at 376-77.  
131 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
132 Pub. L. No. 101-511, Title VIII, §§ 8077(b), (c), 104 Stat. 1892 (Nov. 5, 1990). 
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amendment as a reaffirmation of inherent authority instead of a delegation of federal authority.133 A 
number of other Congressional acts seek to promote greater tribal control and self-determination by 
expanding tribal control over forest resources,134 agricultural lands,135 leasing of surface trust lands,136 
the development of energy resources,137 and the management of other trust lands and resources.138 
The Executive Branch has taken Congress’ lead and, particularly during President Obama’s 
administration, implemented regulations and policies that defer to tribal decisions on rights-of-way 
and leasing as much as allowed under federal law.139 These legislative and executive initiatives are 
consistent with the broader aims and policies of the self-determination era, in which tribal 
sovereignty plays a central role, even while the Supreme Court has chipped away at the foundations 
and extent of such sovereignty. 
 
IV. The Federal-Tribal Relationship 
 
The federal-tribal relationship and the federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes is, at times, 
in tension with tribal sovereignty. As far back as Johnson v. M’Intosh, for example, Federal Indian Law 
limited tribal authority in relation to federal responsibility and oversight of tribal property.140 Chief 
Justice Marshall’s following decisions added further depth and context to the federal-tribal 
relationship and, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall gave birth to both the federal government’s 
trust responsibilities, as “guardian” and the notion of tribes as dependent, as “wards.”141 Like the 
Supreme Court, early enactments of Congress also demonstrated a view of federal authority that 
limited and overrode independent tribal authority.142 While the federal-tribal relationship has ebbed 
and flowed in conjunction with the eras of federal Indian policy described above, its contours 
remain relevant for understanding the role of the federal government in the management, 
protection, and development of tribal natural resources.  
 
Fundamental to understanding the federal-tribal relationship is the basis for the federal 
government’s broad power over Indian affairs. The constitution empowers Congress to “regulate 
commerce … with the Indian tribes,”143 but the nature and scope of the federal government’s 
broader authority for Indian affairs has not always been as clearly stated. For example, it took Chief 
Justice Marshall’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia to make clear that, based on both the language of 
the constitution’s Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause (combined with the treaty promises made 
in treaties with the Cherokee Nation), the federal government, not the governments of the states, 
                                                 
133 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
134 National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 (1990). 
135 American Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act, 25 U.S.C §§ 3701-3746 (1993). 
136 Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-151, 126 Stat. 1150 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 415(h)). 
137 Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506.  
138 Indian Trust Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 114-178 (2016) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5636).  
139 See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. pt. 162, regarding leases of Indian trust lands;25 C.F.R. pt. 169, regarding rights-of-way across such 
lands.  
140 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 591 (1823). (“[T]he Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to 
be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the 
absolute title to others.”) 
141 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831). 
142 See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1790, Ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (restricting land sales by Indians to those authorized by 
treaty with the federal government).  
143 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
17 
 
possessed exclusive authority over Indian affairs.144 Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court read 
these constitutional provisions to provide the basis for Congressional legislation across the entire 
swath of Indian affairs, whether or not such action is directly related to commerce. In fact, the Court 
has said that “the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with 
plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”145 Thus, the commerce clause has “become 
the linchpin in the more general power over Indian affairs recognized by both Congress and the 
courts.”146 
 
In addition to broadly interpreting the constitution to recognize the plenary power of Congress over 
Indian affairs, the Supreme Court has also interpreted the scope of such power to include virtually 
any action of Congress taken with respect to Indians. As described above, this has included 
Congressional acts to abrogate earlier treaty promises,147 to impose federal criminal jurisdiction upon 
tribes and within reservations,148 and to both terminate and restore tribes as tribes.149 Congress also 
relied upon its plenary authority to enact laws protecting Indian children,150 religious freedoms,151 
and ancestral human remains.152 Though one Supreme Court justice recently raised questions about 
the nature and scope of plenary authority,153 particularly in relation to tribal sovereignty,154 the 
breadth of Congressional plenary power of Indian affairs is well established. 
 
Both Congressional plenary power and the history of tribal property rights have contributed to the 
federal government’s authority over tribal lands and natural resources. As Johnson v. M’Intosh 
established, the federal government retained control over the alienability of tribal lands by virtue of 
the doctrine of discovery.155 This vesting of control, deemed “ultimate title,” when combined with 
the notion of the federal government’s role as guardian to the tribes from Cherokee Nation,156 
“resembled the trust concept of private law in which the fee of trust property is held by a trustee for 
the use and benefit of a beneficiary.”157 From those roots, Congress, in exercise of its plenary power, 
adopted the language of trust in the General Allotment Act, indicating that the United States would 
“hold …in trust” each allotment for the benefit of the individual allottee.158 Congress further 
confirmed the trust status of tribal and allotted lands in the Indian Reorganization Act, which 
extended the original periods of trust status indefinitely and authorized the Secretary of Interior to 
take additional lands into trust for the benefit of tribes.159  
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Consistent with the trust status of some tribal lands, Congressional acts define the boundaries of the 
federal-tribal relationship with regard to how tribal property may be leased and managed. As far 
back as 1891, for example, Congress authorized the leasing of tribal and allotted lands, subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior.160 Since then, Congress created a variety of additional 
frameworks for leasing Indian lands for both surface and sub-surface leasing and development.161 
Importantly, however, with the exception of recent additions to these options,162 Congress retained 
federal approval for all such transactions.163  
 
While consistent with the restraints on alienability originally recognized in Johnson v. M’Intosh, this 
ongoing federal role can have significant consequences for tribal natural resources management. At 
its most extreme, the federal role can be entirely exclusive of tribes, as evidenced by a 1919 statute 
authorizing the lease of tribal minerals without tribal consent.164 But even as Congress recognized 
greater tribal authority and required tribal consent for both surface and mineral leases, the remaining 
federal role can frustrate tribal projects and priorities.165 Confounding those frustrations is the 
Supreme Court’s narrowing of the potential for tribes to seek damages from the federal government 
where it fails to carry out its role in a manner consistent with how tribes view the trust 
relationship.166 Though the shift to supporting tribal self-determination continues to motivate the 
evolution of federal agency interpretations of trust responsibility and tribal sovereignty in favor of 
increased tribal control, tribes continue to search for additional tribal resource development options 
that avoid or minimize these potential challenges. 
 
Beyond the development of tribal trust lands and resources, the federal trust relationship is the basis 
for efforts to ensure tribal interests are considered, if not protected, in any federal decision that may 
affect such interests, regardless of whether such decision is limited to Indian Country. While 
Congress mandated federal consultation with Indian tribes where a federal undertaking may impact 
tribal cultural properties,167 a host of other federal actions may impact tribes, their members, and 
resources. Therefore, in recognition of the “unique legal relationship” between the federal 
government and Indian tribes, President William J. Clinton issued an Executive Order requiring all 
federal executive agencies to “have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by 
tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal implications.”168 Both 
Presidents George W. Bush169 and Barack H. Obama reaffirmed these commitments, with President 
Obama’s 2009 Presidential Memorandum requiring of his Administration “regular and meaningful 
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consultation and collaboration with tribal officials in policy decision that have tribal implications.”170  
In order to carry through on that mandate, the Memorandum also required each agency to develop 
“a detailed plan of actions” to implement President Clinton’s earlier Executive Order.171 Thus, the 
federal government’s trust responsibilities to tribes encompass federal agency obligations to involve 
and consult with tribes in off-reservation development decisions, which could impact how those 
developments and decisions are ultimately carried out. 
 
V. Treaties 
 
Treaties made by and between the United States and Indian tribes form the core of the unique 
federal-tribal relationship and have helped define that relationship since the earliest decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Although the Supremacy Clause establishes the primacy of treaties as a legal 
matter, 172 it was not until Chief Justice Marshall began interpreting and applying that clause in the 
context of treaties between the United States and the Cherokee Nation that the true import of 
Indian treaties became clear. The language of those solemn agreements helped define and invigorate 
the constitutional and federal structure of the republic. 
 
Beyond looking to treaties for the core principles of the federal relationship with Indian tribes and 
insulation of their inherent rights from state intrusion,173 courts require particular interpretation of 
treaty language to ensure these fundamental structures are maintained.174 These rules of 
interpretation, the Indian canons of construction, require that treaty language be construed as the 
Indians would have understood it, and the rights reserved by such language remain intact unless 
Congress has expressed clear and unambiguous contrary intent.175 These interpretive rules further 
recognize that a “treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them[—]a 
reservation of those not granted.”176 Therefore, in the words of the leading Indian law treatise, the 
canons are not simply intended to address a perceived inequality in bargaining power between tribes 
and the United States, but “have quasi-constitutional status; they provide an interpretive 
methodology for protecting fundamental constitutive, structural values against all but explicit 
congressional derogation.”177  
 
The exercise by an individual Indian of rights reserved in a treaty can lead to conflict with state 
authority, particularly where the Indian exercises or seeks to exercise a reserved right to hunt or fish 
away from his tribe’s reservation. Because these conflicts cut to the core of its federal Indian law 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has resolved them through further defining and applying its 
Indian canons of construction to limit state authority. In Winans, for example, the Court began a 
long tradition of resolving conflicts related to the off-reservation exercise of rights by Indians in the 
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Northwest. It did so by carefully considering the context in which the treaty was entered and 
construing the treaty at issue as the Indians would have understood it.178 The Court recognized that 
the right to use traditional fishing locations was “part of larger rights possessed by the Indians,” and 
that the “form of the [treaty] and its language was adapted” to preserve the exercise of those rights, 
albeit “in common with the citizens of the territory.”179 The Court rejected the argument that the 
reserved rights were abrogated by the admission of the State of Washington to the Union.180 Central 
to the Court’s interpretation and protection of the reserved right was its recognition that the treaty 
“seemed to promise . . . and give the word of the nation for more” than just allowing Indians to 
exercise the same rights as other citizens of the state.181 Consideration of the treaty in light of the 
canons of construction was crucial in that recognition. 
 
The canons of construction played a central role in resolving subsequent cases arising from similar 
conflicts between the exercise of off-reservation treaty rights and the authority of the State of 
Washington. In Tulee, the Court considered Washington’s conviction of a member of the “Yakima 
tribe” for failure to obtain a state license to fish.182  “[V]iewing the treaty in [ ] light” of the canons 
requiring liberal construction and an understanding of the language as the Indians would have 
understood it, the Court determined that the “state is without power to charge the Yakimas a fee for 
fishing” because the state’s fees could not “be reconciled with a fair construction of the treaty.”183 
Relying in part on Winans, however, the Court recognized a right of the state to “impose on Indians 
equally with others such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature concerning the time and manner 
of fishing outside the reservation as are necessary for the conservation of fish.”184  
 
The Court followed Winans and Tulee with a series of cases defining the balance between off-
reservation treaty rights and state authority to regulate the exercise of those rights as necessary for 
the conservation of a species, but only in a manner that does not discriminate against Indians.185 In 
each of these cases, the Court considered the relevant treaty or other agreement in accordance with 
the canons of construction.186  
 
Most recently, the Court reiterated the importance of the canons of construction in Mille Lacs, where 
it recognized that a tribe’s off-reservation rights to hunt, fish, and gather secured in an 1837 treaty 
survived, despite (1) a subsequent Executive Order purporting to revoke those rights, (2) cessions by 
the tribe in a subsequent treaty, and (3) the Act of Congress admitting Minnesota to the Union.187 
Central to the Court’s treaty interpretation was the requirement that courts “look beyond the written 
words to the larger context that frames the Treaty,” which “sheds light on how the [Indian] 
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signatories to the Treaty understood the agreement.”188 This contextual understanding must come 
from “an analysis of the history, purpose and negotiations of this Treaty,” and may not be drawn 
from analogies to or reliance upon judicial interpretation of other agreements with similar 
language.189 Any argument that “similar language in two Treaties involving different parties has 
precisely the same meaning reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the basic principles of treaty 
construction.”190 
 
Treaties are not simply important due to their constitutional status and the role they played in 
helping define both the federal-tribal and federal-tribal-state relationship. Treaties also remain 
relevant to a range of more common and ubiquitous natural resource issues. Beyond questions of 
off-reservation hunting, fishing, and gathering rights, which may, in some instances, impose 
significant burdens on states to protect and restore treaty resources,191 treaty reserved rights can 
form the basis of tribal claims to water rights,192 on-reservation jurisdictional and regulatory 
questions,193 and the scope of federal environmental review and tribal consultation on off-
reservation infrastructure and development projects.194 Occasionally, the potential for such a project 
to impact treaty rights can lead to a federal agency denying permits necessary for the project to move 
forward.195 Therefore, consideration of treaties within the context of tribal natural resources issues 
and, in particular, doing so in accordance with the canons of construction, is imperative to 
understanding the Indian law questions inherent in such issues. 
 
VI. Conclusion. 
 
The Indian Law landscape is diverse, complex, and can be overwhelmingly confusing, particularly to 
attorneys and practitioners encountering the field for the first time. While each particular legal issue 
facing an Indian tribe, its members, or those seeking to do business with them presents its own 
unique and fact-specific set of challenges, understanding the basic tenets of Federal Indian Law – 
tribal sovereignty, the federal-tribal trust relationship, and the role of treaties – and recognizing the 
broader context of history and the development of those foundational doctrines are key to 
successfully navigating those challenges. This paper provides a foundation for building such an 
understanding while setting the stage for the more discrete and nuanced topics that follow.  
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